I am Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Oxford University. I received my D.Phil (PhD) in Philosophy from Oxford University in 2012. My research is focused on ethics and political philosophy.
I am particularly interested in contractualist moral theories, and in the role personal relationships such as friendship play in morality. My D.Phil thesis aims to develop a contractualist moral theory that draws inspiration from the way in which the value of relationships like friendship explains many of our moral judgements. The resulting “relational” moral theory suggests that our moral judgements can all be viewed as responses to the impact our actions and deliberations have on a valuable “moral relationship” we share with all moral agents.
I am now also interested in exploring some of the wider issues raised by the ethical study of personal relationships. Can the value of a relationship like friendship make it permissible to express partiality towards our friends and loved ones despite the common understanding of morality as strictly impartial? If so, what is the difference between the apparently permissible partiality we show towards our friends and children, and the impermissible partiality that is sometimes shown towards persons of the same race or gender? Where does this leave the moral significance of relationships like that we share with our co-nationals?
I am also interested in several aspects of applied ethics, including the philosophical foundations of human rights, transitional justice, and just war theory. I regularly work with non-governmental organisations on some of these issues, and have recently contributed to projects in Libya, Iraq, and Kenya. I occasionally write about these issues for various media outlets, including the Huffington Post and the Guardian.
I am now also interested in exploring some of the wider issues raised by the ethical study of personal relationships. Can the value of a relationship like friendship make it permissible to express partiality towards our friends and loved ones despite the common understanding of morality as strictly impartial? If so, what is the difference between the apparently permissible partiality we show towards our friends and children, and the impermissible partiality that is sometimes shown towards persons of the same race or gender? Where does this leave the moral significance of relationships like that we share with our co-nationals?
I am also interested in several aspects of applied ethics, including the philosophical foundations of human rights, transitional justice, and just war theory. I regularly work with non-governmental organisations on some of these issues, and have recently contributed to projects in Libya, Iraq, and Kenya. I occasionally write about these issues for various media outlets, including the Huffington Post and the Guardian.
I took the picture above in Leptis Magna on Libya's Mediterranean coast.